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COMPETITION AND COOPERATION ON SHERMAN
ISLAND: AN ANTITRUST ETHNOGRAPHY
Andrew L Gavil*
I. Introduction
From William Howard Taft, Hans B. Thorelli, and William
Letwin, to, more recently, Earl W. Kintner, Martin J. Sklar and
Herbert Hovenkamp, antitrust lawyers, historians, scholars and
groupies have pondered the American historical context that
spawned the Sherman Act.' While the "facts" regarding the emer-
gence of American antitrust policy thus have been well documented,
study and debate continue with regard to the original and continu-
ing purposes of America's guardian of "competition" - antitrust
law. Although it could be tempting to dismiss this continuing study
as being merely of academic interest, domestic and international
events suggest that America, as one of the principal purveyors of
antitrust in the industrial age,2 owes it to itself and to those who
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. B.A., Queens College of the City Uni-
versity of New York, 1978; J.D. Northwestern University, 1981. The author would like to thank
Ms. Laura S. Carnell, Howard University School of Law Class of 1995, and Ms. Trinh P.
Stammler, Howard University School of Law Class of 1996, for their research assistance, and
Professors Walter P. Zenner and Elizabeth Mertz for their encouragement and numerous helpful
suggestions. Of course, Professors Zanner and Mertz should not be held responsible for what their
encouragement has wrought. Appreciation also goes to Professor James P. May and the students
of his Advanced Antitrust Law seminar for their questions and comments on the earlier draft of
this piece.
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. TAFT, THE ANTITRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914) (ana-
lyzing early case history and doctrinal development under the Sherman Act); HANS B. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1954) (discussing the history and development of the central
characteristics and problems of antitrust policy and lessons to be learned by nations and interna-
tional bodies which are attempting to control or repress monopoly); WILLIAM H. LETWIN, LAW
AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1965)
(discussing the historic origins and evolution of the Sherman Act); EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (1978) (discussing
and collecting the legislative history of the Sherman Act); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916 (1988) [hereinafter SKLAR, CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION] (analyzing the evolution of antitrust policy in the context of the reconstruction
of American capitalism); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937
(1991) (developing a comprehensive intellectual history of antitrust and other commercial
regulation).
2. Competition laws, of course, have a history that long predates the Sherman Act. See, e.g.,
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would follow in its footsteps to continue evaluating and studying its
historical experience with competition policy.8
By focusing our attentions on "cultural conceptions of competi-
tion," the Symposium editors have challenged us to consider the
broader role that competition as a cultural norm has played in that
experience." More than just an economic policy reflected in the anti-
trust laws, competition is a pervasive component of the fabric of
American life that emerges in discussions of all aspects of political,
social and economic institutions. As a category of human relations,
however, competition exists only in relation to other norms. "Coop-
eration" and "individualism" are as much a part of the American
culture as is "competition," 5 and at the source of each are "relation-
ships" - social, economic, and political. We define ourselves, our
families, our governments, even our civilizations in terms of these
Lambros E. Kotsiris, An Antitrust Case In Ancient Greek Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 451, 451-57
(1988) (analyzing ancient Greek law treatment of price-fixing cartel); William Letwin, The En-
glish Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 355-56 (1954) (tracing
English common law roots of U.S. antitrust policy). Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Back-
ground of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 759-86 (1955) (same); James May, Antitrust
Practice And Procedure In The Formative Era: The Constitutional And Conceptual Reach Of
State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 497 (1987) (analyzing role of state
antitrust law in the formation of early competition policy); David Millon, The First Antitrust
Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141, 141-45 (1990) (examining the "ideological context" of the early
antitrust statutes).
3. As William Kovacic recently wrote, "[so important are perceptions of history that a sense of
the origins and evolution of American competition policy is as necessary to antitrust literacy today
as is the mastery of legal rules or price theory." William E. Kovacic, Public Choice and the
Origins of Antitrust, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 243, 245 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shugart, eds., 1995). The use, and
abuse, of antitrust history, however, is a source of lively debate. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst, The
New Antitrust History. 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879, 881-83 (1990) (offering persuasive critique of the
invocation of antitrust history in pursuit of a present day antitrust agenda). Nevertheless, while
the dogged search for a "usable past," id. at 883, can detract from the value of historical research,
the fact remains that "[p]erceptions of the past influence antitrust in the present." Kovacic, supra,
at 244. The ultimate goal must lie in distinguishing those historical facts which simply inform us
from those that should properly influence our interpretation of antitrust doctrine.
4. Professor Daniel Ernst associates this kind of call to "locat[e] antitrust within the fullest
possible context in American culture" with a "new antitrust history" movement. Ernst, supra note
3, at 885. He numbers among the representatives of that movement commentators that eschew the
"pursuit of legislative intent" as a source for present day ideological advantage. Id. at 888; see
also James May, Historical Analysis of Antitrust Law, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 857, 868-71
(1990) (highlighting the role of economic and historical analysis in the field of antitrust).
5. The interaction of competition and cooperation has been a frequent theme in antitrust analy-
sis. See, e.g.. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enter., 776 F.2d 185, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Coop-
eration is the basis of productivity. . . .[a]ntitrust [flaw is designed to ensure an appropriate
blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at
every moment."); see also Donald F. Turner, Cooperation Among Competitors, 61 Nw. U. L.
REV. 865, 865-71 (1967) (reiterating the necessary "blend" of cooperation and competition).
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relationships; be they "competitive," "cooperative" or "individualis-
tic." Each of these concepts, however, masks a complex of assump-
tions about human behavior and character, the role of government
and the character of business. Those assumptions are deeply rooted
in the American historical experience, indeed in the broader history
of the development of western civilizations, and are in a continuing
state of evolution.
Nevertheless, antitrust commentary, particularly under the influ-
ence of modern economic discourse, has not directly focused on the
cultural role of "competition," assuming, at least at the surface,
that the cultural primacy of competition had been definitively caste
by America's embrace of free market capitalism. 6 Inherent in the
adoption of Adam Smith's paradigm is the assumption that human-
ity is best accepted as "self-interested." Capitalism's allure is that
it holds the promise of harnessing that self-interest, and, through
the magic of the "invisible hand," channeling it into the production
of the greatest common good. 7 "Coopeyrative" relationships are sim-
ply not the focal point of study.
Antitrust can be productively evaluated in a broader context. In-
deed, although the attention of antitrust commentators to a variety
of previously under-emphasized factors has yielded crucial insights
into antitrust's content and evolution, 8 a more focused assessment of
6. Use of the simpler label "market system" may belittle the crucial role that "capitalism"
plays in defining the American economic system; the two terms are not synonymous. A combina-
tion of both is required to describe fully both the mechanism for making production and distribu-
tion decisions and the source of energy for the system. Thus, the use here of "free market capital-
ism," See ROBERT HEILBRONER, 21ST CENTURY CAPITALISM 95-96 (1993).
7. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith wrote: ". . .[E]very individual ... intends only his own
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. . . .By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 477-78 (E. Cannan ed. 1976) (1776).
8. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 241-349 (presenting comprehensive intellectual
history of nineteenth century political and economic thought, emphasizing in part their impact on
the emergence of antitrust); SKLAR, CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 47-53 (dis-
cussing role of property rights); Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing The Jurisdictional Foundation
Of Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657, 669-83 (1993) (discussing impact of regu-
lation theory and the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause decisions on emergence of fed-
eral antitrust legislation); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic
Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 258-62 (1989)
(presenting a comprehensive study of the evolution of constitutional, economic and political theory
in the nineteenth century as it influenced state and later federal antitrust legislation); David Mil-
Ion, The Sherman Act And The Balance Of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1220 (1988) (argu-
ing that Sherman Act reflected "deeply rooted ideology...aimed at control[ling] political power
through decentralization of economic power"); William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the
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"cultural" attitudes about human relationships can add yet another
piece to the antitrust puzzle. Particularly as we ponder the fate of
stressed domestic industries, as well as the relevance of the Sherman
Act to the world's emerging free market capitalist economies, we
would do well to evaluate whether identifiable cultural attitudes
about competition, cooperation and individualism can be found in
America of the nineteenth century, and, if so, whether any fair gen-
eralizations about those attitudes can be made, particularly with re-
spect to their possible influence on adoption of antitrust legislation.
Such an effort is prompted not solely because of the problems inher-
ent in transporting the legal culture of one society to another,9 but
because an appreciation of the fuller picture of American relation-
ships may be instructive for antitrust policy makers, be they domes-
tic or foreign, in connection with their attempts to evaluate more
fairly the American antitrust experience.
To help in the undertaking, this Article borrows from the litera-
ture and methodology of "law and anthropology," 10 particularly that
of "ethnography." Ethnography, defined as "the qualitative, long-
term study of a society by a researcher who lives among the people,
learns their language, and strives to participate in their culture,"'11
Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3-23 (1991) (addressing the ideological conflict
that has characterized antitrust throughout its history); William H. Page, Legal Realism and the
Shaping of Modern Antitrust Law, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Page, Legal Realism]
(arguing that antitrust law reflects economic theory and market reality); Rudolph J. Peritz, A
Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 264-65 (questioning accepted view of
relationship between competition and antitrust); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Re-
straints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS. L.J. 511, 516-27 (1989) (discussing tension between property
rights and competition).
9. See JUNE STARR & JANE F. COLLIER, HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 131-98 (1989) (collecting several works of legal anthro-
pology that focus on "Exporting and Extending Legal Orders"); Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-
Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REV.
557, 562-69 (1994) (discussing more specifically problems associated with the export of U.S. anti-
trust doctrine).
10. While I use the phrase "law and anthropology," as opposed to other possible formulations, I
do so simply as an act of convention, with no intention of wading into the debate over the appro-
priate nomenclature that should apply to the intersection of the two disciplines. See, e.g., LAW
AND ANTHROPOLOGY xiv-xv (Peter G. Sack, ed. 1992). That intersection has a rich tradition that
has been associated with the legal realist movement and the emergence generally of "law and
social science." See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, ET. AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 232-36 (1993)
(discussing the historical integration of social sciences with law). Moreover, the past influence of
legal realism on the evolution of antitrust provides a further reason why it is fitting to associate
the inquiry into past influences on antitrust law with anthropology. Page, Legal Realism, supra
note 8, at 3.
11. John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Legal Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief History
of the Ethnographic Study of Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 41, 45 (1993).
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presents a promising paradigm for evaluating competition as cul-
ture. A frequent subject of legal ethnography has been dispute reso-
lution models and techniques in various cultures,' 2 and in its pure
sense, it demands painstaking, empirical study. An "antitrust eth-
nography" invites "observation," and perhaps a new "translation"'Is
of our one hundred year plus experiment with antitrust, as it reveals
American attitudes regarding "cooperation," "competition" and
"individualism." With apologies to anthropologists everywhere, this
Article will take great liberties with the concept. 4
To facilitate use of the antitrust ethnography, we will visit "Sher-
man Island" on the eve of adoption of the "Sherman Act."' 5 Bent
on obtaining a better understanding of the "cultural conceptions of
competition" on Sherman Island that may have influenced adoption
of the Act, we will be called upon in the following pages to "live
among the people" of Sherman Island, to "learn their language,"
and to "strive to participate in their culture."'" Along the way, I
offer three hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is that "competition," "cooperation" and "in-
dividualism" should not be confined to their economic meanings. In
12. This particular use of legal ethnography can be traced to the pioneering work of Llewellyn
and Hoebel. KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). More
recent monographs include JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATION-
SHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, ET. AL., LAW
AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS (1994); LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989).
13. I use "translation" here in the sense explored by James Boyd White, to describe a method
of integrating the different "discourse systems" that frequently characterize various disciplines.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM
19-20 (1990) (suggesting that, to be successful in the legal field, one needs to balance various
styles, vocabularies and methodologies stressing the importance of that variety for language).
White provides a useful critique of the assumption that economics, particularly the language of
economics, can be the adequate tool it is often represented to be for "translating" the full range of
social relations. Id. White implores us to accept that "the most profound obligation of each of us
in using his or her language is to try and recognize what it leaves out, to point to the silence that
surrounds it - to acknowledge the terrible incompleteness of all speech, and thus to leave oneself
open to hearing other truths, in other languages." Id.; cf Elizabeth Mertz, Language, Law and
Social Meanings: Linguistic/Anthropological Contributions to the Study of Law (Review Essay),
26 L. & Soc'Y REV. 413 (1992) (reviewing two anthropological studies of the influence of lan-
guage on law as a determinant of social transformation).
14. Although this, too, appears to be somewhat of a "tradition." See, e.g., Axel Leijonhufvud,
Life Among the Econ, 1I WEST. ECON. J. 327, 327-37 (1973) (presenting an ethnographic parody
focusing on the culture of economists).
15. 26 U.S. Stat. 209, July 2, 1890.
16. This prospect will no doubt strike most antitrust lawyers and scholars as not all too bad an
approximation of the shared experience we have encountered on route to obtaining the identity of
"antitrust lawyer."
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the broader context of social systems, they describe categories of
human relationships. Such relationships can be distinctly of one or
another category, or at once evidence characteristics of each. A sin-
gle society might even be comprised of varying combinations of
competitive, cooperative and individualistic relations in social, eco-
nomic and political life.
Second, despite the American rhetorical tradition of lauding "in-
dividualism" and disparaging "cooperative," or "collective" relation-
ships, the legal framework that emerged in the nineteenth century
in support of commercial relations largely facilitated cooperative ec-
onomic relationships. The most prominent evidence of this frame-
work is found in the emergence of the private business corporation
in the first half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it was that coop-
erative structure, supported by developments in constitutional, prop-
erty and contract law, that set the stage for modern conceptions of
competition law. The interaction of corporate, contract, constitu-
tional and property law, however, produced a cultural "antitrust
paradox.'17 The law of private business corporations, with its collec-
tivist orientation, evolved with an overlay of "individualistic" no-
tions of property and contract, producing a uniquely American "cor-
porate capitalist" market system. Through the separation of
management from ownership in the corporate device and the adop-
tion of the "corporate personality," activities driven by individualis-
tic motivations were provided with a communal foundation, one that
greatly enhanced the possibilities to pursue personal wealth and
power. And while widespread economic advancement may have
been a principal consequence of this form of corporate device, so
was the diminution of communal-individualism. This paradox has
always been and remains a hidden source of tension in American
antitrust policy.
Finally, I suggest that the pursuit of economic "progress" was an
additional factor that largely influenced the growth of cooperative
economic organizations, and ultimately the emergence of a commer-
cial infrastructure that included antitrust legislation. Indeed, the
17. The phrase has been somewhat immortalized by former Judge Robert H. Bork, whose 1978
book of the same title maintained that the antitrust laws, which were, in his view, designed to
achieve economic efficiency and to thus enhance consumer welfare, had in fact been interpreted by
the Supreme Court - at least as of the time the book was written - to achieve the opposite
result. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 3-11 (1978); See also United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc'n, 166 US 290, 355 (1897) (J. White dissenting) ("Progress, and
not reaction, was the purpose of the act of Congress").
1230 [Vol. 44:1225
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pursuit of "progress" continues to influence government enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws.
One possible conclusion of the study, therefore, is that cultural
conceptions of competition, cooperation and individualism "com-
peted," along with the goal of progress, for center stage in the policy
making arena. Different attitudes towards competition, cooperation
and individualism emerged across a broad range of relational issues
as different social, legal and political interest groups coalesced into
"movements" that sought to encourage the governing authorities on
the Island to address specific needs for greater doses of one or the
other. The tension among these movements influenced the develop-
ment of the laws of contract, property, tort, procedure, banking, cor-
porations and, ultimately, "antitrust." Before proceeding with a dis-
cussion of these propositions, however, several caveats are in order.
The history of Sherman Island evidences, perhaps not surpris-
ingly, that people are variously competitive, cooperative, and indi-
vidualistic in different settings, and that "self-interest" is not easily
defined. The tension in Sherman Island's past between "competi-
tion," "cooperation" and "individualism" has taken many turns, has
never been finally resolved, and remains as much a source of cul-
tural tension today as it was in 1890. In short, there is no evidence
of a monolithic "culture of competition" to be found in the Ameri-
can antitrust experience. The development of America's commercial
legal infrastructure proceeded over a long period of time, during
which competition, cooperation, and individualism interacted with
one another as well as with emerging social, political and economic
institutions and philosophies to produce the America of 1890 that
adopted the Sherman Act.
Conversations about the value of Sherman Island's experience for
newly emerging free market capitalist economies, or about domestic
industries currently facing upheaval and transition, must therefore
commence with the realization that there may not be any clear "an-
swer" to the question: "Why antitrust?" And, if there were an an-
swer, that answer might be different at various points in the indus-
trial development of the Island. As a consequence, the newly
emerging free market capitalist nation intent on making use of
Sherman Island's experience would likely benefit from assessing the
state of debate on the Island, as well as the state of its legal infra-
structure, in toto, at a point in Sherman Island's industrial history
that most closely parallels its own. Such an assessment must neces-
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sarily take account of the broader range of economic and social rela-
tionships that set the stage for antitrust policy on the Island.
Finally, given the limited goals of our Symposium discussion, this
Article does not purport to be a comprehensive study of the relevant
anthropological, sociological, historical or legal sources available to
evaluate life in the American nineteenth century. That literature is
rich, intricate and extensive, and certainly not amenable to brief
synthesis. The goals of this Article are far more modest. It should
be viewed instead as an invitation to further study - interdiscipli-
nary study - that more fully seeks to integrate anthropological
methodologies into the study of a subject that has historically been
viewed as insulated and arcane, increasingly confined to the insights
of economics - of "competition law." It is a "first word," not a
"last word."
I. THREE HYPOTHESES
A. Competition As Culture
In 1937, Margaret Mead edited a survey of cultural studies under
the title "Competition And Cooperation Among Primitive Peo-
ples." 18 Reissued with additional commentary in 1961,19 the book
collected some thirteen previously undertaken studies of "primitive
peoples" for the sole purpose of evaluating their competitive and co-
operative relationships from the viewpoint of "culture and personal-
ity."2 While the original studies varied somewhat in methodology,
Mead's re-evaluation of them proceeded with some common defini-
tions and parameters. 21 "Competition" was defined as "the act of
seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain
at the same time;"2 "cooperation" as "the act of working together
18. MARGARET MEAD, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES (1st ed.
1937).
19. MARGARET MEAD, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES (rev. ed.
1961). All references herein are to the revised, 1961 edition.
20. Id. at 1. "Culture" is later defined as meaning "human culture, the whole complex of tradi-
tional behavior which has been developed by the human race and is successively learned by each
generation." Id. at 17. She continues: "A culture is less precise. It can mean the forms of tradi-
tional behavior which are characteristic of a certain society, or of a group of societies, or of a
certain race, or of a certain area, or of a certain period of time." Id. at 17-18.
21. The studies involve the Arapesh of New Guinea, the Eskimo of Greenland, the Ojibwa of
Canada, the Bachiga of East Africa, the Ifugao of the Philippine Islands, the Kwakiutl of Van-
couver Island, the Manus of the Admiralty Islands, the Iroquois, the Samoans, the Zuni of New
Mexico, the Bathonga of South Africa, the Dakota and the Maori of New Zealand. Id. at 20-457.
22. Id. at 8.
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to one end."'2 - The definitions focused the survey at the outset on
"competitive and cooperative habits," defined as "a usual or cus-
tomary mode of action." '24 Competitive and cooperative habits, thus
defined, were to be evaluated across economic, social, political, and
educational relationships in each study.25
Mead's original "Interpretative Statement" '26 offers the observa-
tion, however, that the various cultures studied can usefully be cate-
gorized not only as "competitive" and "cooperative," but as "indi-
vidualistic. 27  But Mead expressly distanced her use of
"individualistic" from the colloquial "rugged individualism":
To make our analysis complete, we had to add a third category which we
called individualistic behavior, that is, behavior in which the individual
strives towards his goal without reference to others. . . .It must not be con-
fused with "rugged individualism," or given the aura of exploitation by
others, or aggression toward others, which surrounds the word in current
speech.a8
With these three categories in place, the study also sought to distin-
guish "collective" and "individualistic" activities, which simply de-
scribe "modes of overt behavior," from competitive, cooperative, or
individualistic behavior, which would turn on ultimate motiva-
tions.2 9 To illustrate the distinction, Mead concludes: "[s]o a man
who hunts alone in the bush in order to contribute his kill to a com-
munal feast is engaged in an individual activity inasmuch as he is
working alone, but he is nevertheless engaged in a cooperative enter-
prise.'" Additional distinctions of particular interest were drawn
between "competition" and "rivalry," as well as between "coopera-
tion" and "helpfulness":
[W]hereas competition was behavior oriented toward a goal in which the
other competitors for that goal were secondary, rivalry was behavior ori-
ented toward another human being, whose worsting was the primary goal,
and the object or position for which they competed was secondary. . . . In
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 9-14 (highlighting "Points To Watch For" in the thirteen studies' observations with
respect to economics, social organization, political structure, views of life and the educational
process).
26. "Conclusion" is deliberately avoided in favor of the "Interpretative Statement," in order to
emphasize the non-definitive nature of the survey, as well as the continuing need for further con-
sideration of the issues it posed. Id. at 458.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 16.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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cooperation, the goal is shared and it is the relationship to the goal which
holds the cooperative individuals together; in helpfulness, the goal is shared
only through the relationship of the helpers to the individual whose goal it
actually is. The emphasis is on the relationship to that individual, not upon
the goal itself.8 1
Yet, while some such categorization seemed possible, it was ap-
parent as well that:
no society is exclusively competitive or exclusively cooperative. The very ex-
istence of highly competitive groups implies cooperation within the groups.
Both competitive and cooperative habits must coexist within the
society ...
Nor did competition . . . necessarily mean conflict, and cooperation, soli-
darity. In the cooperative societies competition is often introduced and acts
as an associative mechanism.82
Mead also adds that isolating cooperative and competitive "habits"
within the studies "proved unprofitable," leading to a substitution of
a more broadly focused definition of cooperative and competitive
"social systems." 3
While it would be inappropriate and insupportable to extrapolate
any lessons from these studies that would apply to nineteenth cen-
tury American culture, several useful observations nevertheless seem
possible. The pitfalls inherent in any attempt to define "cultural
conceptions" of competition, cooperation and individualism are im-
mediately apparent. Because a single society can exhibit various
combinations of the three and, indeed, those combinations may vary
31. Id. at 17. The parallel between Mead's "competition" versus "rivalry," and modern anti-
trust law's attempt to distinguish between "competition" and "predation" is striking. See, e.g.,
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (distinguishing fair
competitive business practices with "predatory" practices that attempt to exclude rivals for rea-
sons other than efficiency). In an attempt to distinguish hard competition from "predation," the
Court in Aspen held: "'Thus, 'exclusionary' comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1)
tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the
merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.' " Id. at 605 n.32 (quoting 3 PHILIP AREEDA
& DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978)). The Court added that "[i]f a firm has been
,attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its
behavior as predatory." Id. at 605 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 138
(1978)); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 119 (rev. ed. 1982) ("In ordi-
nary discourse, competition means personal rivalry, with one individual seeking to outdo his known
competitor. In the economic world, competition means almost the opposite. There is no personal
rivalry in the competitive market place. . . .The essence of a competitive market is its imper-
sonal character.").
32. MEAD, supra note 19, at 460.
33. Such systems are defined as "societies in which distribution of goods is a major competitive
activity and societies in which such goods enrich the whole group and contribute to its secur-
ity...." Id. at 462.
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substantially with respect to different relationships within the soci-
ety, complexity abounds and caution must be the rule in approach-
ing any such evaluation. Second, it also seems quite apparent that
"competition," "cooperation," and "individualism," as descriptive
terms, simply cannot be confined to their economic definitions. As
Mead repeatedly points out, the studies are about relationships that
span the entire spectrum of human interaction."' Finally, one could
clearly debate, as well, the very definitions of the terms used by
Mead and the inherent problems associated with any attempt to
evaluate one culture based on the language of another. If Mead's
definitions are "western," however, they can certainly serve as at
least a starting point for any discussion of behavior in a western
society.
B. The American Cultural Tradition of Cooperation
Although a similar comprehensive study of nineteenth century
American culture is far beyond the scope of this Article, it neverthe-
less appears to be worthwhile to use Mead's definitions and these
observations to evaluate not the whole, but a part of the American
culture in the period preceding adoption of the Sherman Act - the
law of commercial relations.35 Through much of the nineteenth cen-
tury, that law expanded the possibilities for establishing different
forms of commercial relationships. No single area of the law did so
with greater fervor and consequence than the area of corporate law.
34. Id. at 2-3.
35. In support of a "cultural" approach to analyzing law, Lawrence Rosen offers the following
observations:
[I]t appears more fruitful to view law as part of the larger culture, a system which,
for all its distinctive institutional history and forms, partakes of concepts that extend
across many domains of social life. In law . . . one has the opportunity to see ordi-
nary assumptions put to the test of scope and implication, and though the response
may be peculiar to its own domain, analyzing the realm of the law as a cultural
phenomenon is no more unusual than viewing aspects of a society through the behav-
ior of its members in the public market-place, the family dwelling, or the house of
worship. . . . [A]s people attempt to comprehend their circumstances and orient
themselves toward them they grasp that world through categories and assumptions
that are themselves cast up by the full range of historical factors that shape their
lives. The anthropologist's task is to sort out these influences and to see how, given the
particular issue under study, a balanced apportionment of the contributing factors
best accounts for the matter at hand.
ROSEN, supra note 12, at 5; see also June Starr & Jane F. Collier, Historical Studies of Legal
Change, 28 CURRENT ANTHR. 367, 368 (1987) ("Culture is adept in shaping different legal forms,
and law is powerful in redefining social issues and even in restructuring the relationships among
groups in society itself, a fact recognized by both the powerful and the weak.").
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Before exploring the evolution of corporate law, however, it will
be necessary to assess the powerful influence of individualism that
pervaded political and social life. As in Mead's framework, 86 to un-
derstand American cultural conceptions of competition, we will also
have to take account of American cultural conceptions of coopera-
tion and individualism. What emerges is a tangle of conflicting self-
perceptions and behavioral patterns. Popular conceptions of individ-
ualism collided with the communal social structures that emerged
from the Revolutionary War period. Legal doctrine, especially the
law of corporations, reflected those tensions by facilitating coopera-
tive relationships necessary to economic progress, but by doing so
with adaptations designed to integrate those new forms into the
broader culture of individualism. Those adaptations, while reflecting
a perhaps uniquely American mix of competition, cooperation and
individualism, may well have contributed to the eventual need for
"anti-trust" legislation, particularly at the federal level.
1. Individualism in American Life
The definition of "individualism," particularly as it might de-
scribe early American culture, is a topic of intense debate. In popu-
lar use, the term frequently has been a synonym for a "rugged indi-
vidualism" in which satisfaction of personal wants reigns supreme.3 7
There is also significant evidence of a more communal conception of
the term. Tocqueville, for example, distinguished "individualism"
from "egoism," defining the former as "a calm and considered feel-
ing which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of
his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with
this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater
society to look after itself."38 In contrast, he defined egoism as "a
passionate and exaggerated love of self which leads a man to think
of all things in terms of himself and to prefer himself to all." 39
Tocqueville quite clearly associated the American character with
36. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text (discussing Mead's "culture and personality"
study of "primitive peoples").
37. As noted above, Mead disassociated her use of the term from this popular one. See supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
38. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 506 (J.P. Mayer, ed. 1969).
39. Id. Combining Tocqueville's definitions with Mead's, the urge to associate "individualism"
with "competition" and "egoism" with "rivalry" is irresistible. See supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text (illustrating a broad application of the various meanings of the terms). Competition,
however, also may be a means to establish or foster communal relations.
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an enlightened self-interest and consequent communal concept of in-
dividualism, not egoism. 40 The equality that flows from democratic
institutions, he argued, breeds autonomy in political, social and eco-
nomic life.41 But that autonomy, that "individualism," necessarily
forges community. "Citizens who are bound to take part in public
affairs must turn from the private interests and occasionally take a
look at something other than themselves. 42 He continued, arguing
that "ambition makes a man care for his fellows, and, in a sense, he
often finds his self-interest in forgetting about himself."'43 Indeed, he
observed that in America, "self-interest" was of the communal, not
the egoistic variety. He further emphasized the communal nature
of American individualism, albeit based on a narrowly conceived
"community," in noting the role of private "associations" in Ameri-
can life. 5
More recent commentators similarly have associated the nine-
teenth century concept of individualism with a communalism that
sets it apart from its twentieth century step-child. Lawrence Fried-
man asserts that "[tihose who spoke about development of the self
[in nineteenth century American life] were thinking of a self quite
unlike its twentieth-century descendant. It was a God-fearing, hard-
working, disciplined, traditional self, as far as private life was con-
cerned."'46 But this "individualism" was tied inexorably to tradi-
tional institutions of family, community and, ultimately, "law":
This image of the individual presupposed a particular kind of society and
generated a particular kind of legal order. In this society individuals (men at
least) were set free from economic restraints, but remained bound to past
values. The powerful socializing forces of a face-to-face society remained
40. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, at 506.
41. Id. at 507-08. As Lawrence Friedman put it more recently:
[Diominant theory [in the nineteenth century] tended to equate individualism or indi-
vidual liberty with economic liberalism. Thus individualism was essentially a political
and economic creed; it put faith in the "invisible hand" and in democratic govern-
ment; it was coupled with a (largely implicit) belief that people would and could
govern and control themselves, without paternalism, without the authority of nobles
and kings - that they could be trusted to manage on their own.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 28 (1990).
42. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, at 510.
43. Id.
44. Tocqueville viewed "self-interest," defined in an enlightened, "communal" sense, as a force
that combats excess individualism and its extreme, egoism. Id. at 525-28.
45. Id. at 513-17. He observed that, in addition to their political activism, "Americans of all
ages, all stations of life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations." Id. at 513.
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 27.
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largely intact: the authority of family, neighbors, teachers and preachers.4 7
Barry Allen Shain recently expanded on these views of nineteenth
century life, with a comprehensive reevaluation of what he terms the
"Myth of American Individualism."4 8 Shain argues persuasively
that early American culture was characterized by "local communal-
ism," whose adherents "'did not espouse the ethic of individualism'
but instead backed a localism in which freedom 'was possible only
within a community of like-minded men.'"9 Indeed, Shain faults
Tocqueville's reading of American individualism as giving insuffi-
cient weight to the influence of communalism in American life.50 In
Shain's view, Tocqueville and other contemporary European observ-
ers "had confused America's localism, communalism, and particu-
larism with social and political individualism."51 He attributes to
them, therefore, partial responsibility for promoting the "myth" of
American individualism. 2
Even if Tocqueville misperceived the nature of American individ-
ualism to some degree, 58 he nevertheless concluded that American
political and commercial institutions provided a significant check on
its potential excesses. 54 "Individualism," even in the nominally com-
munal sense that he defined it, was both a consequence of the prom-
inent role that "equality" plays in democracy, and a long-term
threat to it.55 The isolationism from broader public discourse and
political life that it could ultimately engender, he argued, would
prove fertile ground to aspiring despots. 56 And although he per-
ceived America's "free institutions" as playing a substantial role in
combatting that prospect, 57 he also maintained that alone they ap-
47. Id. at 32.
48. BARRY ALLEN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORI-
GINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994).
49. Id. at 48 (quoting James A. Henretta, The Morphology of New England Society in the
Colonial Period, 2 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 379, 399 (1971)).
50. Id. at 91.
51. Id.
52. Id. But see KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 175 (1989) ("By the beginning
of the nineteenth century, the dominant form of American individualism was the competitive pur-
suit of wealth and status, founded on a legal base that guaranteed not only the security of prop-
erty and transactions but the freedom of contract.").
53. See supra notes 47-54 (explaining two commentators' extensions of Tocqueville's impres-
sion of American individualism).
54. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, at 508.
55. Id. at 507.
56. Id. at 506-08.
57. Id. at 506-13. Tocqueville concludes that "[t]he free institutions of the United States and
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peared unlikely to be up to the task of satiating even communal
individualism.58 Another outlet for both achieving satisfaction and
curbing materialism was needed. 9 That outlet was commerce.60
Tocqueville asserts that America of the early nineteenth century
was characterized not just by the pursuit of political and social rela-
tions, but by the pursuit of economic relations. 1 Thus, in demo-
cratic "equality" he finds not only the engine of social and political
individualism, but the engine of commerce. 62 He notes, however,
that he was "more struck by the innumerable multitude of little un-
dertakings than by the extraordinary size of. . .their industrial en-
terprises."63 Through Tocqueville's eyes, therefore, democracy's pro-
duction in America of equality and, in turn, individualism - again,
defined as narrowly focused, even "self-interested" '64 communalism
- led to a peculiarly American character. While in theory avoiding
egoism, it thrived on the pursuit of small-scale social, economic and
political relations.65 "Freedom to associate," not "freedom to be left
alone" was the cultural norm.66 Consistent with this vision of life,
the political rights enjoyed there provide a thousand continual reminders to every citizen that he
lives in society. . . . I maintain that there is [therefore] only one effective remedy against the
evils which equality may cause, and that is political liberty." Id. at 512-13. For a critical analysis
of Tocqueville's argument, see ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 35-51
(1985).
58. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, at 552-54.
59. Id. at 552.
60. Id. Tocqueville states that: "[iln democratic countries where money does not carry its pos-
sessor to power . . . rich men tend not to know what to do with their leisure . . . . [Niothing has
brighter luster than commerce. Id.
61. Id. at 552-53.
62. Id. at 551-55. In this context, he also argues that the direction of economic development
will be away from agriculture in the direction of "trade and industry." Id. at 552.
63. Id. at 554.
64. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (analyzing the various definitions that lead to
a "self-interested communalism).
65. As Friedman points out, freedom to structure economic relations prompted the transition
from commercial relationships based on status or custom to those based on contract. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 41, at 27. Indeed, that transition largely was facilitated by the emergence of a legal
infrastructure that supported commercial relations, particularly "[tihe idea of contract .... "
which Friedman describes as "one of the basic building blocks of nineteenth-century law." Id.
66. Although as a legal concept this right of association has evolved slowly over time, Lawrence
Tribe views it as a concrete response to those who would fault the Constitution as being "an
unacceptably individualistic document, one insufficiently sensitive to the social dimension of hu-
manity and the communal dimension of society .. " LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 1010 (2d ed. 1988). Moreover, my emphasis here on the communal nature of
individualism in early American life is by no means intended to endorse the positions taken by
those commentators who would use the observation as a basis for limiting constitutional rights
today, such as the right to privacy. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITU-
TION: RACE, RELIGION AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED 16-17, 20 (1994) (expressing that the
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the Constitution guaranteed freedom of association, and contract,
but for very salutary purposes. Individuals were freed from the
yoke of government so that they might be better able to associate in
order to take part in shaping it. In personal social and economic
affairs, too, the point was not to create a nation of islands, but to
free individuals so they might freely associate - that is, pursue
communal activities.
But, as Tocqueville recognized, the potential for the deterioration
of communal individualism into egoism i§ great, and egoism can
feed the desire to aggregate political and economic power. 7 Perhaps
based on his perception that the seeds of such an egoism were pre-
sent in American life, he warns in a powerful passage of the com-
mercial, and ultimately the political, consequences of egoism:
Indeed there is a very dangerous phase in the life of democratic peoples.
When the taste for physical pleasures has grown more rapidly than either
education or experience of free institutions, the time comes when men are
carried away and lose control of themselves at sight of the new good things
they are ready to snatch. Intent only on getting rich, they do not notice the
close connection between private fortunes and general prosperity. There is
no need to drag their rights away from citizens of this type; they themselves
voluntarily let them go. They find it a tiresome inconvenience to exercise
political rights which distract them from industry. . . . They cannot waste
their precious time in unrewarding work. . . . Such folk think they are fol-
lowing the doctrine of self-interest, but they have a very crude idea thereof,
and the better to guard their interests, they neglect the chief of them, that
is, to remain their own masters. 8
These words could easily have been spoken on the floor of the
Senate during debates over the adoption of the Sherman Act. The
classically American themes of equality, distrust of big institutions,
and preservation of small-scale communal relations are all present
rights of the individual were important to the framers not for furthering a selfish desire, but for
protecting one's morality and spirituality).
67. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, at 540.
68. Id. In describing these views of Tocqueville, Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey state:
This unexpected shift from a decent materialism to a more or less thoroughgoing
pursuit of material comforts is concomitant with the rise of a commercial spirit ...
Commerce readily transforms the simple desire for modest comforts into a caricature
of its former self. It comes to be regarded as itself the noblest pursuit, and beguiles
the faculties of the men of most competence in the society. Men of superior intellect
are diverted from politics to business, from public life to private affairs. In commerce,
these men find adequate outlets for their distinctive talents, as well as freedom from
the conformity and vulgarity of political life. In fact, these men threaten to form the
nucleus of a new aristocracy. ...
HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 766-67 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey, eds. 3d ed. 1987).
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- as products of democratic, and perhaps American, cultural
norms.
2. The American Corporation's Evolution from Communal-Indi-
vidualist to Egoistic-Rival
From the vantage point of the early twentieth century, Henry W.
Ballantine could simply state that "[m]uch of the industrial and
commercial progress of the 19th and 20th centuries has been made
possible by the corporate mechanism." 69 But that "mechanism" was
unknown to the commercial world prior to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. How and why it came into being, and how it reflects the cul-
tural paradox of nineteenth century American commercial life, set
the stage for and greatly influenced the emergence of American an-
titrust law.
The term "corporation," along with many of its essential legal
characteristics, has been traced to Roman law.7 0 In its early incar-
nation, however, and for most of its history, the corporation was as-
sociated with public, not private endeavor, usually of the political,
and only later of the commercial variety.7' Individual political acts
were required to award special corporate charters, and they fre-
quently represented grants of exclusive privilege. 2 This was the
"corporation" known to Adam Smith, and condemned by him. 78
69. HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 1 (1927). By the middle of the
twentieth century, Adolph Berle, in a sweeping defense of the achievements of the corporation,
maintained: "[tihis singular organization has succeeded in being at once legal institution, eco-
nomic institution, and agency and chief heir of the explosion of technical progress which is the
outstanding achievement of our generation." ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPI-
TALIST REVOLUTION 9 (1954).
70. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 215 (1983) ("(T]he term 'corporation' . . . was derived from Roman Law, as
were many of the terms used to define it and many of the rules applicable to it."). Berman also
recounts the lineage of "company," originally a form of family-based partnership, an association
of "companions," that later evolved into a business form that grew beyond family. Id. at 353.
71. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188-89 (2d ed.
1985) (explaining that prior to the 19th century nearly all corporations were non-business entities,
being mostly churches, charities, and cites, later evolving into banks and utility companies);
KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 96-97 (1989) (stating that
most corporations chartered from 1789 to 1861 were created for the purposes of improving trans-
portation, and later banking, insurance, and manufacturing).
72. HALL, supra note 71, at 96-97. The 1623 English Statute of Monopolies, for example, did
not abolish the practice of the government granting exclusive corporate charters, it merely trans-
ferred the authority to do so from the Crown to Parliament. See generally THORELLI, supra note
1, at 26 (noting that the Statute, which sanctioned exclusive privileges to corporations, laid the
foundation of modern patent law).
73. SMITH, supra note 7, at 493. Smith argued that corporations of the exclusive privilege vari-
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As Lawrence Friedman observes, "[u]ntil about the middle of the
[nineteenth] century, the corporation was by no means the dominant
form of business organization. Most commercial enterprises were
partnerships. 17  The private business corporation, formed with the
sanction of state law but freely available to all without special legis-
lative charter, is a creation of nineteenth century American state
law. 75 Its emergence appears to be attributable to the increased de-
mand for corporate charters,76 the "cumbersome" nature of individ-
ual legislative action, 77 and a conscious government policy of pro-
moting economic growth, combined with the realization that the
needs of technological progress, particularly in transportation and
communication, demanded a more widely available cooperative
mechanism for raising capital.7
The states thus played a crucial role in facilitating this recon-
struction of American commercial relations. Beginning with a lim-
ited general corporation statute adopted by New York in 1811, the
practice of states adopting general corporation statutes spread rap-
idly .7  Eventually the states engaged in a competition of sorts to lib-
eralize their corporation laws,80 thereby attracting the revenues as-
ety had the same tendencies as monopolies, id. at 69, and were even injurious to themselves. Id. at
144-45.
74. FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 190; see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND:
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 36-37 (1977) (discussing the develop-
ment of industrial management in the United States).
75. FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 195; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 112-14 (1977) (tracing the development of American corporate
law through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
76. FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 190.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also HORWITZ, supra note 75, at Ill (emphasizing relationship between competi-
tion and economic development). Kermit Hall cites several reasons for the movement towards
adoption of state general corporation laws:
First, they equalized the opportunity to secure the legal advantages of incorporation
while encouraging economic growth through private dealings. Second. . . [they] de-
mocratized entrepreneurship during the early stages of industrial growth. Third, these
laws 'also equalized the opportunity for different sections of [a] state to undertake
local improvement projects with their own resources without having to bargain politi-
cally for the privilege.'
HALL, supra note 71, at 98-99 (quoting RONALD E. SEAVOY, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION, 1784-1855 6 (1982)); see also Millon, supra note 8, at 1255 (discussing reasons
for adoption by states of general incorporation statutes).
79. HALL, supra note 71, at 98-99.
80. For an account of the competition among states for corporate patronage, see Christopher
Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677 (1989),
reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1870 145-60 (Robert F. Him-
melberg, ed. 1994); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
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sociated with status as the "state of incorporation." 81 The
partnerships and family associations of the past would give way to
the private business corporation. The "corporate reconstruction of
American capitalism" was under way. 82 Proponents and opponents
of this new commercial order found common ground in asserting the
"inevitability" of corporate growth and concentration.83
The private corporation's past association with monopoly and ex-
clusive privilege, however, meant that it was greeted with skepticism
and even hostility.84 The disdain for large-scale political institutions
evident in early American culture, was easily transferred to large-
1870-1960 .83-84 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ, 1870-1960] (providing a critical analysis of the
development of U.S. corporate laws). As a response to the perception that legislatively granted
corporate charters were inequitable and reflected undue interference by government in the opera-
tion of free markets, the movement towards adoption of general corporation laws was also, in the
view of Kermit Hall, "evidence of the laissez-faire thread that ran through the antebellum econ-
omy." HALL, supra note 73, at 99; see also May, supra note 8, at 262-88 (discussing laissez-faire
constitutionalism as well as contemporary political and economic theory as part of the "conceptual
context" for emergence of antitrust); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-
Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins Of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV.
293, 320 (1985) (tying emergence of general corporation statutes to development of laissez-faire
constitutionalism). Ironically, early challenges to Section 1 of the Sherman Act urged the Court to
declare it unconstitutional on the grounds that it unduly interfered with individual liberty and
freedom of contract. See, e.g., United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 559, 571-72
(1898) (rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge to Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
81. State competition to liberalize corporate laws culminated with New Jersey's adoption in
1888 of amendments to its corporation law authorizing corporations, for the first time, to own the
stock of other corporations. CHRISTOPHER GRADY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 41-45 (1993) (tracing the development of New Jersey's
General Corporation Act). The rapid substitution of the "holding company" for the trust and
much of modern subsidiary corporate forms was a consequence. See, e.g., HORWITZ, 1870-1960,
supra note 80, at 83-84 (stating that the passage of the New Jersey corporation law inspired other
states to follow suit and repeal many restrictions on corporate consolidation). Yet, even as the
states competed to liberalize their corporation laws, attracting greater revenues to their treasuries,
they became concerned over the consequences of unbridled corporate growth. Thus, both the de-
velopment of corporate law and the emergence of the antitrust movement paralleled one another,
both originating at the state level. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 8, at 658 n.1. (noting that commen-
tators agree that opposition to the trusts "developed as a grass-roots movement that bore its first
fruit at the state level"); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 266 (attempting to reconcile efforts by
states simultaneously to liberalize corporation laws and regulate trusts).
82. See generally SKYLAR, CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note I (tracing the historical
development of American markets and corporate laws); cf. ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER 1877-1920 76-132 (1967) (exploring evolution of American values from those of the small
town to those of the emerging urban middle class).
83. See generally HORWITZ, 1870-1960, supra note 80, at 80-85 (stating that in the 1890's the
trend in American economic thought was that the emergence of large scale corporations and con-
solidation was inevitable).
84. FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 194; see also TONY A. FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS:
ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA, 1880-1990 11-42 (1992) (offering comparative
evaluation of late nineteenth century responses to big business).
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scale social and economic organizations that appeared to be incon-
sistent with equality, posing a direct threat to communal individual-
ism.8 5 This hostility grew as the corporation gave way to pools and
combines, which in turn gave way to the trusts, and ultimately to
the holding companies of the late nineteenth century. Indeed,
through the eyes of a prominent observer of late nineteenth century
American life, competitive, corporate capitalism presented a para-
dox. It was both a product of the individualism and free association
that constituted America's response to its colonial experience and a
grave threat to them:
The power of groups of men organized by incorporation as joint-stock com-
panies, or of small knots of rich men acting in combination, has developed
with unexpected strength in unexpected ways, overshadowing individuals
and even communities, and showing that the very freedom of association
which men sought to secure by law when they were threatened by the vio-
lence of potentates may, under the shelter of the law, ripen into a new form
of tyranny.86
Something went awry in the pursuit of ever greater degrees of
commercial cooperation. Even as the law gave its imprimatur to the
general business corporation, it embraced characteristics for it that
increasingly distanced the corporation from its predecessors. Al-
though corporations, like those predecessors, were communal in na-
ture, aggregations of human and economic resources, assembled
with the help of legal sanction in pursuit of cooperative and produc-
tive enterprise, they were also becoming individualistic. In a great
and, perhaps, uniquely American irony, the corporation, a necessa-
rily cooperative undertaking, was being functionally integrated with
individualism. This integration of communalism and individualism
was particularly evident in the corporation's separation of manage-
ment from ownership87 and in the law's recognition of it as an indi-
vidual "personality." 88
85. For an excellent account of the period, see Millon, supra note 8, at 1224-28 (discussing
concentration of economic wealth in late nineteenth century and public reaction to it); see also
SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM: 1885-1914, 71-93 (1959) (discussing "THE
INDIVIDUAL IN AN IMPERSONAL SOCIETY" with particular focus on the rise of large, private busi-
ness corporations).
86. 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 591-92 (3d ed. 1908).
87. As Alfred Chandler recounts, "As late as the 1840's, with very few exceptions, owners
managed and managers owned." Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Emergence of Managerial Capital-
ism, 58 Bus. HIST. REV. 473, 473 (1984), reprinted in, HIMMELBERG, supra note 80 at 31-61.
88. The features of the modern corporation - limited shareholder liability, separation of man-
agement from ownership, corporate personality, and perpetual life - evolved throughout the nine-
teenth century. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 11-64 (providing a history of classical political
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The separation of management from ownership permitted small
groups of professionalized management to reap the benefits of the
corporate form in terms of raising capital, while pursuing narrowly
defined material goals that were not necessarily in the interest of the
bulk of the stockholders or the public.8 9 The fact that industrialists
could, relying on "Social Darwinism," assert emphatically that they
merely represented survival of the fittest,90 represented an astonish-
ing paradox. The "they" were the beneficiaries of a legal construct
adapted to promote economic productivity and the expansion of
wealth. "Rugged individualism""' hardly had anything to do with
the success of "robber barons"92 and "captains of industry;"" ex-
ploitation of cooperative legal structures did.
The association of the corporation, an organization, with the char-
acteristics of personality, of "individuality," also was particularly
crucial to its status. Thurman Arnold persuasively argued in 1937
that it was this identification of the corporation as an "individual"
that later begot "the mystical philosophy that put the corporate or-
ganization ahead of the governmental organization in prestige and
power. . . ." In that association, the corporation avoided, at least
initially, condemnation of the sort reserved for government at the
time of the American Revolution, and the inherent contradiction of
abhorring large governmental organization, but not large commer-
cial organization, persisted for a time. 5 The "symbol" of individual-
economy and the business corporation in the U.S.); HORWITZ, 1870-1960, supra note 80, at 65-
107 (tracing the development of corporate theory).
89. THORELLI, supra note 1, at 255; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 121 (1932) (discussing the separation of
corporate management from ownership and the concept of "limited liability"). For a discussion of
the ameliorating influence of external, as well as internal changes in corporate governance since
Berle and Means's 1932 book, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALY-
SIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 135-36 (1975). But see Louis A. Kaplow, Extension of Monop-
oly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 550-52 (1985) (collecting recent scholar-
ship that acknowledges disparity between interests of corporate management and shareholders and
noting significance of that disparity for antitrust).
90. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 350 (discussing views of Andrew Carnegie); RICH-
ARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 58 (rev. ed. 1992) (discussing
views of William Graham Sumner on success of industrialists).
91. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
92. See generally MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1962) (discussing role of en-
trepreneur from the Civil War to the end of the nineteenth century in the development of America
into a "unified industrial society").
93. See Thorstein Veblen, The Captains of Industry, in THE PORTABLE VEBLEN 377-94 (Max
Lerner, ed. 1948).
94. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 186 (1937).
95. Id. at 187-88.
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ism was successfully grafted onto an organization, facilitating its
growth and success even as it masked its true nature."8 As Arnold
notes, "[t]he laissez faire religion, based on a conception of a soci-
ety composed of competing individuals, was transferred automati-
cally to industrial organizations with nation-wide power and dictato-
rial forms of government. 97 Nevertheless, even as the myth of the
"individualized corporation" took hold as a legal construct in a fash-
ion that appeared consistent with historic, American cultural
norms,9" its reality challenged American cultural sensibilities. 9 As
Herbert Hovenkamp succinctly puts it, "[t]he American business
corporation had become a person but had lost its soul."' 00
But long before the corporation yielded the trust, and the trust
the holding company, the common law sought to balance the devel-
oping law of corporate cooperation with another emerging body of
law: "competition."'' As both a legal and a cultural phenomenon,
therefore, the corporation and its progeny became a focal point for
debating "cooperation," "competition" and "individualism," since it
possessed characteristics of all three. The interplay of these catego-
ries of human relationships in the emergence of corporate capitalism
was and remains a controlling feature of American antitrust law -
one that is a product of American cultural norms.
The Sherman Act thus was born of both a devotion to and an
aversion to "cooperation." Far from being an attempt to implement
competition, it was offered as an antidote to excessive cooperation in
96. Id.
97. Id. at 189.
98. Arnold observed: "It is a familiar social phenomenon to see the symbols of the habits of
pioneer times transferred as a social philosophy to later institutions to prove that we still are
following the examples of our fathers." Id. at 188.
99. Typically, economic analysis of the corporation has not been concerned with the corpora-
tion's cultural origins. Rather, economists have increasingly viewed the corporation as a "product
of a series of organizational innovations that have had the purpose and effect of economizing on
transaction costs." See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981) (arguing that transaction cost economizing largely ex-
plains the major features of the business corporation).
100. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 16; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 194 ("The word
soulless' constantly recurs in [nineteenth century] debates over corporations.").
101. For a more thorough account of the origins of the private corporation and its relationship
to competition law, see HORWITZ, supra note 75, at 109-39. In his later volume, Horwitz explores
the evolution of the legal attributes of the modern corporation, such as limited liability and consti-
tutional rights. See HORWITZ, 1870-1960, supra note 80, at 72-78; see also HOVENKAMP, supra
note 1, at 11-64 (explaining the development of the "classical corporation", along with related
concepts of "vested corporate rights", "the corporate personality", "limited liability", and corpo-
rate power).
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the form of individualistically-motivated cooperative social struc-
tures that threatened the continued survival of communally-moti-
vated individualism. As Arnold put it:
In this atmosphere the antitrust laws were the answer of a society which
unconsciously felt the need of great organizations, and at the same time had
to deny them a place in the moral and logical ideology of the social struc-
ture. They were part of the struggle of a creed of rugged individualism to
adapt itself to what was becoming a highly organized society.102
C. The Imperative of Progress
There is no over-arching theory that can rationalize all of the fac-
tors that influenced the adoption of antitrust legislation by the 51st
Congress. While some antitrust historians have collected evidence to
support singular purpose explanations of the Sherman Act's legisla-
tive history, 103 and yet others have offered interest-group explana-
tions for its passage,"" the Act was and remains a focal point for
many conflicting American cultural perceptions. Today, as in 1890,
we debate as a society what Louis Brandeis once labeled "the curse
of bigness.' 0 5 And while some decry "big government," whereas
others decry "big business," easy applause can always be gotten in
America by condemning something that is "big."' 1 6 The American
desire to balance communal individualism, based as it had been in
the Revolutionary War period and for a time thereafter on small
scale social and economic units, with an overpowering desire to pur-
sue mass economic progress, even if it demands ever larger institu-
tions, capable of fully exploiting the resources of a rapidly growing
nation, remains a cultural paradox.
102. ARNOLD, supra note 98, at 211; see also WALLER, supra note 9, at 579-80 (discussing
Arnold's observations and role of "cultural myth" in emergence of the Sherman Act).
103. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7 (1966) (identifying efficiency as the primary purpose of the Sherman Act's framers);
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Effi-
ciency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 (1982) (preventing wealth transfers
as the primary purpose of the Sherman Act's framers). For a critique of the approach taken by
Bork and Lande, see Ernst, supra note 3 at 882-83.
104. See William E. Kovacic, Public Choice and the Origins of Antitrust, in THE CAUSES OF
ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3 at 243-53 (discussing the work of
Bourdeaux, Di Lorenzo and Parker).
105. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 99-181 (1935) (differentiating between
regulation of competition and regulation of monopoly).
106. For a thought-provoking, empirically-based challenge to the modern association of corpo-
rate "bigness" with "efficiency," see WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COM-
PLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1986).
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Antitrust has provided a lens, however, for focusing those dispa-
rate values, and it has done so by consistently emphasizing one, in
particular - "progress." Drawn with regularity to those industries
perceived as being most crucial to economic development, and those
most in turmoil in their time, antitrust has consistently played a role
in defining the pattern of industrial progress. From the railroads, 10 7
to oil' 8 and steel,'09 on to manufacturing,110 then retailing,"' and
more recently, service and high technology industries,"' antitrust
has been compelled to make its mark by advancing a seemingly per-
petual agenda for progress."'
That agenda has forced a continuing process of assessment and
reassessment of American cultural conceptions of competition, coop-
eration and individualism. In emphasizing one or another of those
norms, however, antitrust policy-makers have been and continue to
be guided by their own perceptions of how best to implement an
antitrust policy that supports general government policies favoring
economic growth. And while William Baxter"" and James C. Miller
III" may have thought the road to growth was paved with less gov-
ernment, less antitrust and freer markets, even if "bigger" business
was a consequence, whereas Anne K. Bingaman favors more govern-
ment antitrust enforcement and perhaps harbors suspicions of big
business"e - yet both could find common ground in articulating
107. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
108. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
109. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
110. United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v. Aluminum
Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
111. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States. v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S, 488 (1942).
112. Community Comm. Co. v. City of Boulder, Co. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982); United States v.
Western Electric Co., Inc., 46 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
113. The trend is quite evident and most striking when the cases are presented chronologically,
as in Professor Thomas Morgan's recently published antitrust casebook. See THOMAS D. MORGAN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS (1994); see also Eugene
V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567
(1947) (arguing that the degree of competition achieved in U.S. industrial organization will dic-
tate society's success in maintaining high levels of production, employment and commerce).
114. William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CAL. L. REV.
618, 619-20 (1983) (discussing "Consumer Welfare As The God of Antitrust Law" in the context
of the 1982 merger Guidelines).
115. See, e.g., James C. Miller III, Reindustrialization Through The Free Market, 53 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 121, 121-130 (1984) (discussing role of "industrial policy" to restore long-term indus-
trial growth).
116. See, e.g., ANNE K. BINGAMAN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, ANTITRUST DIVISION,
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the purpose of their chosen paths: economic growth.
III. Conclusion: Sherman And The World
This "antitrust ethnography" suggests that the Sherman Act
arose not from a desire to implement competition in a positivist
sense. That task could hardly have been the point of a negative pro-
hibition such as the Sherman Act.117 The legal foundations for capi-
talism lie elsewhere, in the laws of contract, property, equality and
liberty. 118 Instead, the Sherman Act was conceived as a device for
curbing the excesses of cooperative commercial institutions, which,
because of their integration with individualism of the "egoist" vari-
ety, threatened to restrict the continued existence of traditional,
small-scale individualistic/communal social and economic relations.
The need for legislation was a push from below, from the states,
which had in pursuit of economic progress facilitated the creation of
large corporate structures that intermingled various cultural needs
of nineteenth century Americans. If we today remain uncertain, or
at best divided, with respect to those underlying cultural issues, it is
fair too to ask: what wisdom do we have to offer others?
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND AMERICAN PROSPERITY, ADDRESS
BEFORE THE ANTITRUST SECTION OF THE NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION, Jan. 26, 1995 (discuss-
ing role of antitrust in provoking economic progress); Andrew I. Gavil & Stephen H. Wenc, Clin-
ton Antitrust: A Look At The First Year, 23 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 5, 28 & n.73,
33-34 (1994) (noting presence of this theme in speeches and press releases from the first year of
the Clinton Antitrust Division).
117. The Federal Trade Commission Act, by contrast, adopted in 1914 at the height of pro-
gressive influence over antitrust, reflects a more clearly articulated attempt to implement a policy
of competition. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988) (providing for the establishment of the Federal
Trade Commission and dealing with the promotion of export trade and the prevention of unfair
methods of competition). This role for the Commission is particularly evident in its rule-making
authority. Id. § 45 (giving the Commission the authority to prohibit unfair practices); see also
BRANDEIS, supra note 109, at 112-24 (stating that regulation is essential in order to preserve
competition, as excesses of competition may lead to monopoly). Brandeis argued that "regulated
competition" is the only reasonable alternative to monopoly, which he viewed as the inevitable
result of unregulated competition. Id. at 104. Consistent with this view, he endorsed creation of
the Federal Trade Commission and suggested that it should "have ample powers of investigation,
not only as mainly for the purpose of detecting and exposing lawless business, but in order to
foster and build up law-abiding business." Id. at 134-35.
118. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) (discuss-
ing capitalism and economic policy in the United States and Great Britain). For a review of the
historical uses of law by colonial powers to transform underdeveloped colonies through imposition
of capitalism, see YASH GHAI, ROBIN LUCKHAM & FRANCIS SNYDER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF LAW (1987), an anthology of largely Marxist writings that address the role of law in trans-
forming colonized peoples to capitalism; see also Sally Engle Merry, Law And Colonialism (Re-
view Essay), 25 L. & Soc'Y REV. 890, 909-12 (1991) (discussing "LAW AND CAPITALIST
TRANSFORMATION").
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Others may not share the American mix of cultural conceptions
of competition, cooperation and individualism, or be inclined to
make the same cultural compromises America made in assembling
its nineteenth century legal infrastructure. While many marvel at
the engine of self interest, others may view it with apprehension. We
should know. Americans throughout our history have simultaneously
exhibited enthusiasm for economic growth and apprehension for the
safety of our cherished political, social and economic freedoms in
the face of large institutions, be they governmental or economic.'"
And while early Americans formulated those feelings based upon
their colonial experience, later generations have faced their own de-
mons, only to arrive at the same state of cultural impasse. Ironi-
cally, despite the many differences among Americans that can flow
from distinct historical encounters with authority, there persists
common ground, a core American, and perhaps not so American,
character, that desperately wants to balance the desire for personal
autonomy, the profound need for community and the fear of the
"leviathan," however clothed. 120 Culturally, we looked to antitrust
in 1890, and continue to do so today, to resolve that imbalance. And
that is a tall order for competition law to fill.
119. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 8, at 1236-47 (discussing impact of liberalism and republi-
canism on American aversion to large concentrations of economic wealth). For an excellent pres-
entation of the argument that "the main significance of large size in units of social organization"
- be they social, commercial or governmental - "lies in their tendency to substitute compulsion
in place of persuasion, to emphasize discipline rather than liberty," see Louis A. Schwartz, Insti-
tutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 4
(1960); see also Richard Hofstadter, What Happened To The Antitrust Movement?, in THE
PARANOID STYLE OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 195-204 (1965) (stating that
the "sweeping language" of the Sherman Act reflected the uncertainties of Congress and the
American public as to the role of the government in antitrust law).
120. Describing the "Paradox of Community," in the conclusion to their study "Law and Com-
munity in Three American Towns," Greenhouse, Yngverson and Engel offer the following obser-
vation about this observed conflict:
The myth of community, on the one hand, emphasizes harmony, or 'getting along'
and a distinctive 'way of life' that links people in a collective endeavor with other like-
minded individuals. The ethic of individualism, on the other hand, emphasizes self-
reliance, toughness, and autonomy - qualities that are posed as being central to pro-
gress and 'getting along' in a market economy. The ambiguity of 'getting along' (ei-
ther as harmony or progress) captures the tension to which we refer. Here we see the
inherent contradictions of an ideology of community in which harmony is extolled but
where only the tough (spiritually, economically) can belong.
Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 173.
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